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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PROFESSORS CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
May v. U. S., 199 Fed. 53. Self incrimination. "That internal revenue offi-
cers, in raiding defendant's place of business for alleged violations of Oleomar-
garine Act Aug. 2, 1886, c. 840, section 17, 24, stat.* 212 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
2234), seized certain articles, letters, papers and two promissory notes signed
by defendant M., which notes were afterwards introduced in evidence against
him, did not constitute a violation of his constitutional right against being com-
pelled to testify against himself."
COURTS.
People v. Miller, Ill. 99 N. E. 873. Amendment of record. "Though the
record of the Criminal Court of Cook County sent up on appeal showed that
the July term, 1905, was opened on July 5th, instead of on July 3d, which was
the first Monday in July, as required by statute, where the records of the crim-
inal court showed that it was opened on July 3d, by the judge who convened the
July term, another judge of the same court could permit an amendment of the
record so as to make it speak the truth by reciting that fact as a placita to a
judgment in a case tried by him in the July term."
EVIDENCE.
People v. Enright, Ill. 99 N. E. 936. "Criminal law-evidence-privilege of
defendant. In a criminal prosecution where the defendant did not testify, an
instruction that the jury should consider as though the defendant was not al-
lowed to testify, was properly refused."
State v. Flanagan, N. J., 84 AtI. 1046. "On a trial of the defendant for man-
slaughter for pushing one from a trolley car, causing his death, evidence of the
disorderly conduct of the defendant towards others in the car just prior to the
embarking of the deceased and the act of the defendant which caused his death
was allowed to show his state of mind and continuity of disposition toward
those about him on the car. Held, that this was competent as evidencing his
state of mind as carried forward and exhibited in a criminal act."
People v. Gibson, Ill. 99 N. E. 599. Admissibility of evidence of other of-
fenses. "In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence that about the same time
and in the same room accused committed the crime against nature upon the
prosecutrix, and had intercourse several times afterwards, was .admissible.
"In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence was not admissible that the
accused had intercourse with a playmate of prosecutrix in the same room a
few minutes after the act charged; the two acts not being so connected as to
be part of the same transaction."
Fritz v. State, Ind. 99 N. E. 728. Burden of proof as to sanity. "Defend-
ant's sanity or mental capacity to form an intent to kill is, if in issue, an essen-
tial element of murder, and this element the state is bound to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, and not merely by a preponderance of the evidence. The
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evidence of the defendant's insanity need not predominate in weight over that
going to show his sanity, but if the jury find it sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt as to his sanity, the law requires an acquittal."
ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-INTENT.
State v. Gallagher, N. J. 85 Atl. .207. "Indictment charged defendant with
an assault upon William H. Edwards with intent to kill the said Edwards.
Upon the trial it was proven that defendant intended to kill Mayor Gaynor.
This was a statutory crime. The court held that the common-law principle,
that the intent with which an act is done determines the legal character of its
consequences although such consequences operate upon a different person from
that intended, applied to statutory crimes.
FORMER JEOPARDY.
Roman v. State, Tex. Cr. App. 142 S. W. 912. Crime Used as Circumstan-
tial Evidence of Another Crime. Defendant was tried and acquitted for stat-
utory burglary by breaking and entering a railroad car. He was then tried
on an indictment for larceny of the contents of the car. His plea of former
jeopardy was overruled and the court refused his request for an instruction
that the jury, in determining the question of his guilt or innocence of larceny,
could not consider for any purpose whether or not he broke and entered the
car from which the property was stolen. Held, that the common law rule
merging burglary and theft when committed contemporaneously and making
conviction of one bar a prosecution for the other is abrogated by the provisions
of the Penal Code making burglary and theft, though growing out of the same
transaction, two separate and distinct offenses. While defendant could not be
prosecuted a second time for burglary, any evidence tending to show that he
was guilty of theft should be admitted, even though it prove that he was really
guilty of burglary. The conviction was reversed on another ground.
People v. Darr, Ill. 99 N. E. 651. Offeltse Charged. "An indictment charg-
ing that the defendants conspired to obtain a bank check for $650 from an in-
surance company by obtaining a policy on certain chattels and thereafter setting
'fire to the chattels with intent to defraud the company by falsely pretending
that a loss of $650 resulted from the fire, etc., charged an offense of conspiring
to burn goods with an intent to defraud an insurance company, and did not bar
a subsequent prosecution for the offense of burning goods to defraud the in-
surance company."
People v. Goldfarb, 138 N. Y. Supp. 62. "Accused was arrested without
warrant and charged by affidavit before a magistrate having jurisdiction with
disorderly conduct tending to a breach of the peace contrary to Consolidation
Act (Laws 1882, c. 410), section 1458, making persons using threatening or in-
sulting behavior in a public place, whereby a breach of the peace may be occa-
sioned, guilty of an offense, and was duly arraigned and entered upon trial, and
after one witness was sworn the magistrate directed that the accused be dis-
charged and a new complaint made; and the new complaint, based on the same
facts, charged a violation of Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40), section 720,
making it a misdemeanor to disturb the occupants of a car by disorderly con-
duct, of which offense the magistrate did not have jurisdiction. Held, that the
accused was put in jeopardy on the hearing on the first complaint, so that his
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discharge was a bar to a subsequent prosecution under the second complaint.
even though the magistrate did not actually intend to acquit the accused by dis-
charging him on the first complaint."
GAmING.
Ferguson v. State, Ind. 99, -W. W. 806. "A slot machine operated by the
player depositing a nickel therein and then turning a crank, whereupon the
machine will automatically pay the reward, which will always contain a pack-
age of chewing gum of the retail value of five cents, and sometimes in addition
thereto one or more checks which may be used in playing the machine in the
same manner as nickels are used, is a gambling device, within Burns' Ann. St.
1908, Par. 2474, punishing the keeping of devices for gaming; though by means
of indicators the player is informed as to what the record will be before each
play, though there is no method of knowing what the reward will be as to
subsequent plays."
GRAND JURY-MANNER OF SELECTING JURORS.
United States v. Nevin, 199 Fed. 831. 'Where members of a grand jury are
summoned by order the court from the body of the district without the draw-
ing of names, the validity of the indictment is not affected if the members are
duly qualified."
INDICTMENT.
Commonwealth v. Cornell, Mass. 99 N. E. 975. Sufficiency. "In view of R.
L. c. 218, sections 17, 39, making a detailed description unnecessary, giving the
defendant a right to a bill of particulars if the charge is not sufficiently set out,
and making the charge sufficient when in the words of the statute, an indictment
for exposing poison to cattle was not indefinite in using the word 'cattle."
People v. Fenman, 137 N. Y. Supp. 933. Sufficiency. "Accused cannot be
adjudged guilty of larceny under allegations of an indictment under Penal Law
(Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40), section 947, which after charging that the accused,
with intent to defraud and deprive C. of certain goods and appropriate them to
the use of the defendant and defendant's principal, did falsely pretend and
represent to C. by a written instrument, set out in full, relating to the means
and ability of the principal of the accused to pay for the goods, and that the
representations were in all respects false, and that C. did sell to the principal
of the accused on credit certain goods, and delivered them; such indictment
plainly indicating that it was not the intent of C. to sell the goods to the de-
fendant, but to the defendant's principal."
Reese v. U. S., 33 Sup. Ct. Repr. Formal defect. "The delivery of an in-
dictment to the court by the foreman of the grand jury in the absence of the
other jurors, if a defect at all, is 'in matter of form only' within the meaning
of U. S. Rev. St, Sect. 1025, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 720, providing that no
indictment presented by a grand jury shall be deemed insufficient nor the trial,
judgment, or other proceedings thereon be affected by any such defect which
shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant, it not being disputed but that
the indictment was found and returned into court as a true bill."
People v. Clark, Ill. 99 N. E. 866. Validity of statute. "Cr. Code Sec. 98
(Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 38), provides that every person who shall obtairi from
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any other person any money or property by any device commonly called the
confidence game shall be imprisoned, etc., and section 99 provides that in every
indictment under the preceding section it shall be a sufficient description of the
offense to charge that the accused did unlawfully, etc., -obtain from the person
named "his money (or property in case it be not money)" by means of the con-
fidence game. Held, that section 99 when construed to authorize the charging
of obtaining 'money' by the confidence game without any added words of de-
scription, did not violate bill of rights, section 9, giving the accused the right
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
Hawkins v. State, Tex. Cr. App. 142 S. W. 917. Clerical Error. An indict-
ment for theft charged the defendant with stealing property with intent to
"apprpriate" it to his own use. Held that as only one letter was omitted, and
with this omission no other word was spelled, and no other meaning conveyed,
the court would refuse to quash'the indictment. It was said that if an entire
syllable was omitted, or with a letter missing a different word was spelled with
a different meaning, the, indictment would be quashed.
The case of Jones v. State, 25 Tex. App. 621, 8 S. W. 801, 8 Am., St. Rep,
449, in which the same word was spelled "appriate" and the indictment quashed,
was distinguished on the ground that an entire syllable "pro" was omitted. It
is not clear how the court knew that the letters omitted were "pro" rather than
"rop."
Roman v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 142 S. W. 912. Description of Stolen Prop-
erty. An indictment charged the larceny of 92 buckets of "lard." The proof
was that the defendant stole a compound of cottonseed oil and beef fat, which
was used as a substitute for lard, looked like lard, and was called lard by the
witnesses, several of whom thought it was lard. The trial court charged the
jury that if the "property had the appearance of the product of the hog known
as 'lard,' and was called, used as, for and as a substitute for said hog produt
known as lard, then in law it is lard." Held that as it was commonly called
lard in Texas and also in Louisiana, where it was made, there was no variance,
the evidence was properly admitted to prove the charge in the indictnient, and
the instruction to the jury was correct.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-PRESENTMENT.
Bresse v. Uited States, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. "Where more than twelve
grand jurors voted to find the indictment a true bill, a delivery of the indict-
ment to the presiding judge by the foreman, unaccompanied by the grand
jurors, was not a defect as would work such a prejudice on the defendant as
to justify a-reversal of the conviction."
INDICTMENT AND INFORMIATION-MOTIONS TO QUASH-GROUNDS.
Pittsburgh, C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. State, Ind. 99 N. E. 801. "The ques-
tion whether Act March 8, 1909 (Acts 1909, c. 178), requiring railroad locomo-
tives to be equipped with automatic bell-ringers, violated Const. U. S. art. 1,
Par. 8, or the Interstate Commerce Laws enacted thereunder, was not raised
by the motion to quash an indictment for a violation thereof not showing on
its fzice that defendant's road or locomotives was operated outside the state, in
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view of Burns' Ann. St. 1908, -Par. 3065, expressly limiting such a motion to
defects apparent on the fact of the indictment."
ImPROPER AR'GUmENT OF COUNSEL-OBJECTIONS NECESSITY.
McPherson v. State, Ind. 99 N. E. 984. "The misconduct of the prosecuting
attorney in his argument to the jury cannot be taken advantage of on appeal,
unless accused moved to set aside the submission and discharge of the jury, or
asked the court to direct the jury to disregard the improper statement, or take
other action to neutralize the misconduct."
INSTRUCTIONS.
People v. Barkas, Ill. 99 N. E. 699. "In a prosecution for homicide, an in-
struction that the jury need not believe the testimony of the accused, and should
not do so, if, after fairly and impartially considering all the evidence, they be-
lieved that the accused wilfully and knowingly testified falsely to any material
matter, is erroneous because improperly directing the jury to disregard defend-
ant's testimony; the word 'should' being equivalent to 'ought to.'
"In a prosecution for homicide, an instruction that, though the accused is a
competent witness, the jury are the judges of the weight to be given his testi-
mony, and that the jury should consider all the circumstances surrounding the
case, and give the accused's testimony 'only' such weight as they believe it en-
titled to, is improper; the word 'only' constituting a caution to the jury to be
careful in giving credit to the accused's testimony."
JURISDICTION.
State v. Hall, Coni. 84 Atl. 923. "Whether a case is a criminal one is not
to be determined from the form of the complaint and process alone, so that a
proceeding under Acts 1909, c. 260, section 8, as amended by Acts 1911, c. 205,
section 5, providing for a proceeding whereby delinquent taxpayers may be
committed to jail or to the workhouse, is not rendered a criminal proceeding
within Gen. St. 1902, sections 1482, 1483, which provide that the criminal courts
of common pleas shall have jurisdiction of only such criminal cases as are
appealed to them from lower courts, and prescribe the procedure therein, by
the fact that the complaint therein was in criminal form."
JURY.
Rigsby v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 142 S. WSV. 901. Improper Inflence. After
the jury had been sworn in the trial of a prosecution for the illegal sale of
liquor, the court adjourned that a prohibition speech might be delivered in the
courthouse, in a campaign to secure state-wide prohibition. The jurors re-
mained during the speech; which lasted an hour and a half and contained "much
forcible oratory and invective with regard to the violation of the local option
law." When the court reconvened the defendant moved to dismiss the jury
because they had heard the speech. The motion was overruled. This was held
to be error. As the jury had been exposed to improper influences which may
have affected their verdict, the presumption of law is against the purity of that
verdict. As the state did not show that the jury had not been influenced by the
speech the conviction was reversed.
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MOTIONS IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT-GRoUNDS.
Pittsburgh, C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. State, Ind. 99 N. E. 801. "The ques-
tion whether Act March 8, 1909, is constitutional, was not raised by a motion
in arrest of judgment in view of Burns' Ann. St. 1908, Par. 2159, authorizing
such motion only where the .grand jury had no jurisdiction of the offense, or
where the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a public offense. The
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal cause cannot be reviewed by a motion
in arrest of judgment."
PROOF OF MOTIVE.
People v. Enright, Ill. 99 N. E. 936. "The state is not required to prove the
motive for a crime, although evidence of motive is admissible, and hence an
instruction that, if the evidence failed to show any motive, this was a circum-
stance which should be considered by the jury was properly refused."
TRIAL.
State v. Breinan, N. J., 84 AtI. 1066. Necessity of plea. "Where an allega-
tion filed by the prosecutor of the pleas charged distinct offenses in two counts,
and accused plead not guilty to the second count only, a conviction of the offense
charged in the first count was invalid, because not supported by a plea, without
which there can be no issue and no valid trial.
"Error in convicting a person of an offense charged in a count to which he
has not pleaded cannot be cured after verdict by entering a plea of not guilty
without the accused's consent."
